Waman Rao v/s. Union of India
- Shivangi Choudhary, SLS, Noida
- September 11, 2020
Content :
In the year 1961, the Maharashtra government passed an Act named Maharashtra Agricultural Lands Ceiling on Holdings Act, 1961 which was enacted as an implementation of the Directive Principles of State Policy contained in clauses (b) and(c) of Article 39 of the Constitution, which imposed a maximum ceiling on the agricultural holding and allowed the Maharashtra government to acquire the land in excess on the ceiling for the purpose of distribution of it to the landless farmers. The Act was imposed on 26th January, 1962. After the imposition of the Act, there were many amendments made in the Act, along with lowering of the ceiling, over the period. The validity of these Acts and the related Amendments were challenged in the Bombay High Court. In the year 1976, the Divisional Bench of Bombay High Court, dismissed the challenges in the Vithalrao Udhaorao Uttarwar v. State of Maharashtra case. The court said that the provisions challenged were not open to challenge on the ground that they varying rights conferred under Part III of the Constitution, since those Acts were placed in the 9th Schedule by the Constitution through the 17th Amendment Act, 1964, and the Constitution 40th Amendment Act, 1976, and also that due to the promulgation of the emergency, the fundamental rights conferred under the article 14 and 19 could not be enforced.
This decision in the case of Vithalrao Udhaorao Uttarwar v. State of Maharashtra was further challenged in the Bombay High Court, where the appeal against the constitutional validity of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands Ceiling on Holdings Act, 1961, was dismissed in the case of Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra in the year 1977. The main point encouraged in those petitions was that the Principal Act, as revised, was void being violative of the subsequent stipulation to Article 31A(1), to the extent that it made an artificial \'family unit\' and fixed the ceiling on the agricultural possessions of such "family unit\'. The contention was that the infringement of the specific stipulation denied the reproached laws of the insurance given by Article 31A. That contention was dismissed by the Court on the view that regardless of whether the challenged provisions were violative of the subsequent stipulation, they would get the protection of Article 31B by reason of the incorporation of the Principal Act and the Amending Acts in the 9th Schedule of the Constitution. The Court thought about whether, actually, the arrangements of the condemned Acts were violative of the subsequent stipulation and held that it was totally for the government to choose what strategy to make to rebuild the agrarian framework and the Court could not be expected to assume the role of an economic adviser for pronouncing upon the wisdom of such policy. The second provision to Article 31A(1) was therefore held not to have been breached.
